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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOEL SILL,
Plaintiff-Counterclaim
Defendant/Appellant,

*

*

Case No. 20050245-CA

v.
BILL HART d/b/a HART
CONSTRUCTION,
Defendant-Counterclaimant/
Appellee.

*

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

INTRODUCTION
In his responsive brief, Bill Hart presents a number of arguments in opposition
to Joel Sill's contention that the trial court erred in ruling that UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1ll(4)(a) (2001) did not apply to Hart when he served his counterclaim complaint on
Sill. This brief will address Hart's arguments in the order in which he presents them.
ARGUMENT
The trial court incorrectly ruled that Subsection (4)(a) did not apply to Hart's
counterclaim complaint.
A,

The plain language of Subsection (4)(a) covers Hart's counterclaim
complaint.
Hart first argues that Subsection (4)(a), on its face, does not apply to his

counterclaim because Sill was "the plaintiff that filed the action and served the

complaint." Aple.'s Br. 11. According to Hart, he "never served a complaint on
Sill[;] [r]ather, Hart's pleading was an answer that included a compulsory counterclaim
to foreclose his mechanic's lien." Id. Therefore, the argument goes, the plain
language of Subsection (4)(a) could not apply to his counterclaim.
Subsection (4)(a) applies to the filing of "an action to enforce a lien filed under
[the mechanic's lien statutes]." Hart does not dispute that he commenced such an
action when he filed his counterclaim. Nor could he. See Harman v. Yeager, 103 Utah
208, 134 P.2d 695, 696 (1943) ("[a] counterclaim is viewed as an original action,
instituted by the defendant against the plaintiff"). He, however, insists that the term
"complaint" does not embrace a "counterclaim" and, thus,, he never served the
"complaint" referenced in Subsection (4)(a). He contends that this is plain because
"[t]he Utah Legislature was very precise when it designated only one of the six
pleadings allowed under Utah R. Civ. P. 7(a) (i.e., a complaint) as being subject to the
requirements of Subsection (4)(a)." Aple.'s Br. at 12. Implicit in that argument is that
the term "complaint," as used in Rule 7(a), does not embrace a "counterclaim."
First, nothing in the plain language of Subsection (4)(a) suggests that the
legislature either had Rule 7(a) in mind when it enacted (4)(a) or intended the narrow
definition of "complaint" Hart contends is compelled by that rule (i.e., a definition of
"complaint" that does not include a counterclaim). Assuming Hart is correctly
interpreting Rule 7(a), had the legislature intended such a narrow definition for
"complaint" based on its like interpretation of that rule, it would have expressly
2

referenced Rule 7(a). Moreover, the legislature's use of the phrase "files an action to
enforce a lien filed under this chapter" at the beginning of Subsection (4)(a) - a phrase
nearly identical to that at the beginning of UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-18(1) (2001), which
this Court construed, prior to the enactment of Subsection (4)(a), to include a
counterclaim seeking enforcement of a mechanic's lien (American Rural Cellular, Inc.
v. Systems Communications Corp., 939 P.2d 185, 193 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) - leads
one to the more reasonable conclusion that the legislature intended that "complaint" be
given its commonly accepted meaning, which plainly includes a counterclaim.
Alternatively, even if the legislature did have Rule 7(a) in mind when it enacted
Subsection (4)(a), as Hart suggests, it necessarily would have selected the term
"complaint" from that rule to express its intent to include a counterclaim in (4)(a).
Rule 7(a) provides:
Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a
counterclaim; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains a crossclaim; a third-party complaint, if a person who was not an original party
is summoned under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party answer, if
a third-party complaint is served.
If the legislature were of the view that a counterclaim is a "pleading," as Hart appears
to assert, see Aple.'s Br. at 12 & n.5, and then, in enacting Subsection (4)(a), went to
Rule 7(a) to look for a term that covered both an initial complaint and a counterclaim, it
necessarily would have chosen "complaint" from the list of "pleadings" contained in
that rule.

3

That is so because "counterclaim" is not expressly set forth in Rule 7(a). The
legislature, therefore, would have looked for a term in Rule 7(a)'s list that applied to a
counterclaim. A counterclaim certainly is not an "answer," a "reply to a
counterclaim," an "answer to a cross-claim," a "third-party complaint," or a "thirdparty answer" - five of the six "pleadings" listed in Rule 7(a). The legislature
naturally would have rejected those pleadings as not descriptive of a counterclaim.
Selection of the term "complaint" from Rule 7(a), however, would be entirely
consistent with the prevailing view of courts and commentators that a counterclaim is a
complaint - it just is one filed by a defendant against a plaintiff. Rule 7(a) therefore
does not advance Hart's contention that the legislature, by using the term "complaint"
in Subsection (4)(a), must have intended a reference only to an initial complaint filed by
a plaintiff.1
As noted in Sill's opening brief, other courts, when confronted with the issue of
whether the undefined term "complaint" in a statute included a counterclaim, have
correctly concluded that it did. Indeed, every case Sill has been able to find that
addresses the question, the court has concluded that the statutory term "complaint"
includes a counterclaim. In addition to the cases cited in Sill's opening brief (Wilson v.
Baldwin, 519 S.E.2d 251, 253 (Ga. App. 1999), and Brink's Inc. v. City of New York,
1

The trial court also cited Rule 7(a) in support of its conclusion that the term
"complaint" in Subsection (4)(a) does not include a counterclaim. Decision at 3. The
court described Rule 7(a) as "distinguishing a complaint from other pleadings." The
court failed to observe, however, that Rule 7(a) does not distinguish a "complaint" from a
"counterclaim."
4

533 F.Supp. 1122, 1123 ((S.D.N. Y. 1982)), Aplt.'s Br. at 19, the following decisions
are representative: Uncle Henry's, Inc. v. Plaut Consulting, Inc.,

F.Supp.2d

,

2005 WL 1595288 at *3 (D. Maine 2005) ("I conclude that the only reasonable way to
read the statute is to interpret the word 'complaint' to mean the pleading asserting the
claim in question, here Plaut Consulting's counterclaim."); Breech v. Hughes Tool Co.,
41 Del. Ch. 128, 189 A.2d 428, 429-30 (Del. 1963) (statute providing that if it appears
in any "complaint" filed in chancery court that a defendant is a nonresident, court may
order his appearance and may provide for seizure of his property, is not to be strictly
construed to end that "complaint" exclude a counterclaim, but rather a counterclaim
against a nonresident is within the purview of the statute). Significantly, Hart has not
cited a single case where a court, confronted with that issue, has held that the statutory
term "complaint" does not include a counterclaim.
What Hart cannot avoid is that the term "complaint," when used in the absence
of limiting language, is commonly understood to include a counterclaim. See, e.g.,
Liberty Chevrolet, Inc. v. Rainey, 791 N.E.2d 625, 629 (111. App. 2003) ("[W]e agree
with the trial court that, under the Agreement, a counterclaim is a 'complaint.'");
Lebrecht v. Orefice, 105 N.Y.S.2d 318, 320 (N.Y. 1951) ("In the absence of language
indicating a legislative intent that Section 23 * * * shall be inapplicable to
counterclaims, this court is of the opinion that Section 23 applies equally to complaints
and counterclaims, since for all practical purposes the counterclaim is the same as a
complaint."); Quality Clothes Shop v. Keeney, 106 N.E. 541, 542 (Ind. App. 1914)
5

("It would seem, therefore, that, by the express language of the statute, a counterclaim
is a complaint, and the courts have held repeatedly that a counterclaim is similar in
character to a complaint, and is, in fact, in the nature of a complaint against the
plaintiff."). Nothing in the plain language of Subsection (4)(a) suggests the legislature
intended that the word "complaint" be given anything but its common meaning. In
short, Hart's counterclaim is within the scope of Subsection (4)(a)'s plain language.
B.

The term "counterclaim complaint," commonly used by the courts, correctly
describes a counterclaim.
Hart chastises Sill for using the term "counterclaim complaint," which is widely

used by courts to describe a counterclaim.2 Indeed, Hart calls it a "made up term,"
which he urges this Court to avoid, particularly in the mechanic's lien context (though
he offers no explanation why the term is inappropriate in mechanic's liens cases even
though it is used in other kinds of cases). Hart assails the use of the term as an
improper invitation for this Court to ignore the "express language of Subsection (4)(a),
and its direct and specific reference to a 'complaint' as the exclusive pleading with
which various other forms must in certain cases be served on a homeowner." Aple.'s
Br. at 14.
This should not delay the Court long. Sill's citation of numerous cases in which
the court has used "counterclaim complaint" when talking about a counterclaim is

2

Hart suggests that the use of the term "counterclaim complaint" is isolated. Aple.'s
Br. at 14. That is not true. A Westlaw search for "counterclaim complaint" in the
"allcases" database produces 57 cases where the term is used.
6

intended only to illustrate the prevailing view that a counterclaim is a complaint. That
view, of course, supports the argument that when the legislature used the term
"complaint" in Subsection (4)(a), without any limiting language, it intended that the
term be given its commonly accepted meaning, which includes a counterclaim. That
conclusion necessarily arises from a straightforward application of a basic rule of
statutory construction: when construing a statute, a court examines its plain language
and gives the operative terms their commonly understood meanings.
C,

Hart fails to distinguish the American Rural Cellular decision in arguing that
the term "action," as used in Subsection (4)(a), has a distinctly different
meaning than that term has in UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-18(1) (2001).
In an effort to validate the trial court's conclusion that the language of UTAH

CODE ANN. § 38-1-18 (2001), construed by this Court in American Rural Cellular, Inc.
v. Systems Communications Corp., 939 P.2d 185 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), is very
different from the language in Subsection (4)(a), Hart argues that the word "any" in
front of the word "action" in § 38-1-18 and the use of the term "complaint" after the
term "action" in Subsection (4)(a) compel the conclusion that "an action" in Subsection
(4)(a) does not include a counterclaim. As explained below, that the legislature
intended such fine distinctions between the words used in § 38-1-18(1) and the nearly
identical words used in Subsection (4)(a) simply is not apparent from either American
Rural Cellular or the plain language of Subsection (4)(a).
Hart's argument on this point is anchored in his contention that the legislature's
use in Subsection (4)(a) of the term "complaint," which he insists must be interpreted
7

narrowly to refer only to an initial complaint filed by a plaintiff, reflects an intent to
limit the scope of the phrase "action to enforce a lien" to an original action filed by a
lien claimant as a plaintiff. That constmction, however, is plausible only if one accepts
Hart's position that the undefined term "complaint" - standing alone in the absence of
any limiting language - is not reasonably interpreted as including a counterclaim and
necessarily means only an initial complaint filed by a plaintiff. As discussed above,
that view is contrary to the prevailing, practical view that a counterclaim is a complaint
and that when the term "complaint" is used in a statute with no qualifying language, it
naturally includes a counterclaim. Hart offers no good reason for this Court to reject
that prevailing view.
Thus, the only reasonable reading of Subsection (4)(a) is that the introductory
phrase "action to enforce a lien" includes a counterclaim (just as this Court in American
Rural Cellular said was the case for nearly identical language in § 38-1-18(1)), and that
the unqualified term "complaint," which follows that introductory phrase, has its
commonly understood meaning, which includes a counterclaim. Contrary to what the
trial court concluded and Hart now argues, the unqualified term "complaint" does not
serve to modify and restrict the preceding phrase "action to enforce a lien" but, instead,
simply refers to the vehicle by which the action to enforce the lien is brought (whether
that be through an initial complaint filed by the lien claimant as a plaintiff or through a
counterclaim filed by a lien claimant who is the defendant in an action brought by the
homeowner). See Uncle Henry's, Inc. v. Plaut Consulting, Inc.,
8

F.Supp.2d

,

2005 WL 1595288 at *3 (D. Maine 2005) ("I conclude that the only reasonable way to
read the statute is to interpret the word 'complaint' to mean the pleading asserting the
claim in question, here Plaut Consulting's counterclaim."). In other words, given the
structure of Subsection (4)(a), the phrase "action to enforce a lien," rather than being
modified and restricted by the subsequent term "complaint," compels a broad
interpretation of "complaint" - i.e., one consistent with its commonly understood
meaning, which includes a counterclaim.
Had the legislature intended the more restrictive reading of Subsection (4)(a)
Hart proposes, the legislature - mindful of the construction this Court gave the phrase
"action brought to enforce any lien" in American Rural Cellular and of the common
understanding that the term "complaint" includes a counterclaim - certainly would have
made explicit the limitation on Subsection (4)(a)'s reach to only an initial complaint
filed by a lien claimant as a plaintiff. It is unreasonable to think, as Hart would have it,
that the legislature put in Subsection (4)(a) "action" language nearly identical to that
construed in American Rural Cellular with the notion that the reader of (4)(a) would be
left with the task of divining a legislative intent to give the nearly identical "action"
language a meaning different from that determined in American Rural Cellular.
Rather, the legislature would have made that intention clear - for example: "If a lien
claimant files an action, as a plaintiff in an initial complaint and not as a
counterclaimant, to enforce a lien filed under this chapter * * *." To think otherwise is

Q

to ascribe to the legislature a hide-the-ball attitude in its enactment of Subsection (4)(a)
that simply is not suggested in anything Hart cites to this Court.
Finally, Hart argues that Wilson v. Baldwin, 519 S.E.2d 251 (Ga. App. 1999),
md Brinks, Inc. v. City of New York, 533 F.Supp. 1122 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), cited in
Sill's opening brief, ultimately support the trial court's construction of Subsection (4)(a)
rather than Sill's. Those cases, however, do support Sill's position. In Wilson, the
statute at issue prohibited bringing "a complaint seeking to obtain a change of legal
custody" of a child "[a]s a counterclaim." Wilson, 519 S.E.2d at 327. That statutory
prohibition illustrates the common understanding that the term "complaint" includes a
counterclaim. If that were not the commonly understood meaning of "complaint,"
there would be no need for an express prohibition against bringing a complaint in the
form of a counterclaim. The absence of similar limiting language with respect to the
term "complaint" in Subsection (4)(a) indicates a legislative intent that "complaint" be
given its commonly understood meaning (i.e., the term includes a counterclaim).
The Brink's court, in construing the term "complaint" in one statute to include a
counterclaim, relied on the following language from another statute: "A cause of
action contained in a counterclaim or a cross-claim shall be treated, as far as
practicable, as if it were contained in a complaint." Brink's Inc., 533 F.Supp. at 1123
n.3. Direct parallels to that provision exist in Utah law. As noted in Sill's opening
brief, it is well-settled in this state that "[a] counterclaim is viewed as an original
action, instituted by the defendant against the plaintiff and is tested by the same tests

m

and rules as a complaint." Harmon v. I7eager, 103 Utah 208, 134 P.2d 695, 696
(1943). Further, under Rule 8(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a counterclaim must
meet precisely the same standards as a complaint: "A pleading which sets forth a claim
for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim,
shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems
himself entitled" (emphasis added). Those parallels lead one to the same conclusion
that the Brink's court reached: the term "complaint" includes a counterclaim.
D.

The authorities cited in Sill's opening brief support the view that a
counterclaim is a complaint.
Hart's various attacks on the authorities Sill cites in support of his proposed

construction of Subsection (4)(a), Aple.'s Br. at 18-22, once again reduce to an
argument that the term "complaint" does not include a counterclaim. Hart, however,
offers just one case - Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l v. Pelella, 350
F.3d 73 (2nd Cir. 2003) - to support that view. The principal point from Pelella he
asks this Court to consider is the majority's conclusion that the term "action," as used
in section 101(a)(4) of the federal Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,
does not embrace a counterclaim, because "action" is qualified by the phrase "to
institute." Hart argues by analogy that the term "action" in Subsection (4)(a), because
it is qualified by the subsequent phrase "service of the complaint," likewise does not
embrace a counterclaim. For the following reasons, that analogy does not work.

11

The Pelella majority's construction of "action" was based on the view that "[a]
defendant does not 'institute' an action when he asserts a counterclaim." 350 F.3d at
82. According to the majority, an action is only "instituted" when a plaintiff files a
complaint, and "[i]n sharp contrast, a defendant asserts a counterclaim in response to a
plaintiffs institution of an action." Id. Thus, the "sharp contrast" the majority found
between a "complaint" and a "counterclaim" lay in the perception that one does not
"institute an action" by filing a counterclaim. Hart asks this Court to adopt that view
and apply it in construing the terms "action" and "complaint" in Subsection (4)(a).
Aple.'s Br. at 21 ("[Pelella] also confirms that a 'complaint' is properly considered as
something in 'sharp contrast' from a counterclaim. Pelella confirms, therefore, that
Subsection (4)(a) simply does not apply to this case in which Hart did not file an
'action' nor serve a 'complaint.'").
The problem with Hart's invitation to adopt the Pelella majority's reasoning for
the purpose of interpreting Subsection (4)(a) is that the majority's major premise - that
one does not institute an action through a counterclaim - is directly contrary to Utah
law. As previously noted, the Utah Supreme Court has made clear that "[a]
counterclaim is viewed as an original action, instituted by the defendant against the
plaintiff and is tested by the same tests and rules as a complaint." Harmon, 134 P.2d at
696. While Hart suggests that the foregoing principle is no longer applicable because
Harman "was decided prior to the 1951 adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
which distinguish between the various pleadings," Aple.'s Br. at 21, he offers no
12

analysis of either those rules or any post-1951 case law that even suggests Harman is
not good law. At bottom, the Harman court, like many other courts and commentators
have, correctly equated a counterclaim with a complaint. Hart cannot escape that. Nor
can it be assumed the legislature was unaware of Harman, which expresses the clear
majority view that a counterclaim is in substance a complaint, when it enacted
Subsection (4)(a).
E.

Contrary to Hart's contention, original or general contractors are not
exempt from the requirements of Subsection (4)(a); nor is a lien claimant
exempt from those requirements if the homeowner ultimately is unable to
exercise rights under the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery
Fund Act.
In the span of nine pages, Hart presents a variety of arguments of why he

believes that, even if Subsection (4)(a) applies to a contractor who counterclaims to
enforce a mechanic's lien, its requirements do not apply to an original, general
contractor like himself. Aple.'s Br. at 22-30. The nub of those arguments is that
because the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act (hereafter
"Residence Lien Act") applies only to claims and liens of subcontractors, not those of
original or general contractors, he is not subject to Subsection (4)(a)'s requirements to
serve on the sued homeowner the referenced instructions and forms concerning the
Residence Lien Act. As explained below, the plain language of Subsection (4)(a)
defeats that argument.
Subsection (4)(a) unambiguously states that "[i]f a lien claimant files an action to
enforce a lien filed under this chapter involving a residence, as defined in Section 3813

11-102, the lien claimant shall include with the service of the complaint on the owner
of the residence [certain instructions and forms relating to the exercise of rights under
the Residence Lien Act]" (emphasis added). Hart makes no argument that he is not a
"lien claimant," a term used throughout the mechanic's lien statutes to refer to someone
who has filed a lien under those statutes. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-l-7(2)(b) (2001)
(where the term "lien claimant" first appears). Nowhere in any of the mechanic's lien
statutes is there so much as hint that "lien claimant" does not include an original,
general contractor like Hart. Where the legislature intended to draw distinctions
between an original or general contractor and a subcontractor, it used those specific
terms to distinguish the two. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 38-1-2 (defining and
distinguishing "original contractor" and "subcontractor"), -14 (separating "original
contractors" and "subcontractors"), -17 (separating "contractor" and "subcontractor")
/

(2001).
Thus, on its face, Subsection (4)(a)'s requirement that the "lien claimant" serve
certain instructions and forms on the sued homeowner applies to an original, general
contractor who, like Hart, has filed a lien under the mechanic's lien statutes. Had the
legislature intended to limit the reach of Subsection (4)(a) to subcontractors, then it
would have said just that - for example: "If a lien claimant who is a subcontractor files
an action to enforce a lien ** *."
Significantly, Hart complied with the requirement under UTAH CODE ANN. § 38l-7(2)(h)(l) (2001) that his lien notice contain "a statement describing what steps an
14

owner, as defined in Section 38-11-102, may take to require a lien claimant to remove
the lien in accordance with Section 38-11-107 [under the Residence Lien Act]" (copy of
Hart's Notice of Lien - Def.'s Ex. 2122 - is attached as an addendum to this brief).
That requirement is similar to the one relating to the Residence Lien Act contained in
Subsection (4)(a) and similarly applies to anyone filing a lien under the mechanic's lien
statutes (no exception for an original, general contractor).
Hart's further contention that Subsection (4)(a) does not apply in the situation
where the homeowner ultimately is unable to exercise rights under the Residence Lien
Act fares no better. The statute does not limit the instructions/forms requirement to
those situations where the owner of the residence actually is in a position to exercise
rights under the Residence Lien Act. Nor does it exempt from that requirement a lien
claimant who may believe that the owner has no such rights.
Hart's view that serving the required instructions and forms on Sill (or other
homeowners in Sill's position) would be useless is of no import. The legislature has
decided otherwise, and "[i]t is not the function of this Court to evaluate the wisdom or
practical necessities of legislative enactments." Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County
Commission, 624 P.2d 1138, 1143 (Utah 1981). In short, Hart cannot escape the
mandatory requirements of Subsection (4)(a) simply because he thinks they are a bad
idea under certain circumstances.
In Landmark Systems, Inc. v. Delmar Redevelopment Corp., 900 S.W.2d 258
(Mo. Ct. App. 1995), the Missouri Court of Appeals correctly rejected a similar attack
15

on a notice requirement in that state's mechanic's lien statutes, where the lien claimant
argued that its failure to comply with the requirement should not bar its lien because the
liened property owner was "a large corporation sophisticated in the areas of real estate
and construction" and "had knowledge of the mechanic's lien law":
It is true, as [the lien claimant] suggests, the purpose of § 429^012
is to warn inexperienced property owners of the danger to them which
lurks in the mechanic's lien statute. However, this court is also aware the
requirements of our statute are mandatory. The statute does not limit the
necessity of this notice to those inexperienced with, or having lack of
knowledge about, the mechanic's lien laws. The statute has no exceptions
and this court will not accept the invitation to create an exception in this
case. Additionally, * * * allowing a lien where there was not substantial
compliance with the notice provision contained in § 429.012 would add
another issue to each mechanic's lien case, namely the extent of the
property owner's knowledge of the mechanic's lien laws. The fact such
an exception was not incorporated into the statute indicates the legislature
did not intend such a result.
900 S.W.2d at 261-62 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). That analysis
applies with equal force here in determining the reach of Subsection (4)(a). Whether
the circumstances in any given case are such that a homeowner is or is not in a position
to exercise rights under the Residence Lien Act may be an issue in many mechanic's
lien cases when litigation is commenced. It is precisely for that reason that the
legislature could have reasonably determined that Subsection (4)(a)'s requirements
would apply to all lien claimants, thereby avoiding litigation on the question of whether
a lien claimant in a particular case justifiably decided not to provide the homeowner
with the instructions and forms.
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In sum, Subsection (4)(a) plainly applies to all lien claimants, Hart included.
The legislature did not carve out any exceptions to the instructions/forms requirement,
and this Court should not create one.3
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments and those contained in Sill's opening brief,
this Court should reverse the trial court's judgment in favor of Hart on his mechanic's
lien foreclosure action and dismiss that action. The Court also should reverse the trial
court's awards of prejudgment interest attorney fees to Hart, the only basis for which is
the favorable judgment on the lien action. The Court then should remand the case to
the trial court with directions to award Sill his reasonable attorney fees and costs in
defending against Hart's invalid lien action at trial and on appeal.
Dated this %l day of August 2005.

DAVID B. THOMPSON
MILLER VANCE & THOMPSON PC
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Counterclaim
Defendant/Appellant

The legislative history Hart cites provides no assistance. It only confirms what the
parties have acknowledged all along: The Residence Lien Act applies to claims and liens
by subcontractors. That fact does not alter the analysis of what legislative intent the plain
language of Subsection (4)(a) reflects, insofar as the notice requirements in that provision
are concerned.
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ADDENDUM

AnnFivniTM

WHEN RECORDED RETUF N TO;

0 G A 0 9 9 0 0

Robert J. Dale, Esq.
McMunay, McMurray, Dale . 'arkinson, P.C
455 F.ast 500 South, Suit* 30C
Sail Lake City, Utah 84111

B*AH32 Pe00511-00512

ALftH SPRIOSi SUHttlT CO RECORDER
2002 JAN 31 10S4O AH FEE $12.00 BY Df*
REQUESTS HART CONSTRUCTION

wmcEoruEE
TO WHOM IT MAY CONC E RN:
Notice is herefc iventhattheunderaigi»d,WillbrnH«rt,dbaHartConsmictJ07i, 1391
IjKky John Dr., P.O. Box 166- . *ark City, Utah 84060. telephone: (435) 649-3763, hereby claims and
intends to hold and claim a lit I pursuant to §§ 38-1-1, at. seq., Utah Code Annotated (as amended),
upon land and premises owne nd/or reputed to be owned by Joel Sill, which land and premises are
located in Summit County, Ste e of Utah, and are described as follows (the "Property"):
ALL OF HOMESTE/ L NO. 15, THE COLONY AT WHITE PINE CANYON, PHASE I
AMENDED FINAL SI 3 DIVISION. ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT THEREOF ON
FILE AND OF RECOl I IN THE OFFICE OF THE SUMMIT COUNTY RECORDER.
ALSO TOGETHER MTH AND SUBJECT TO ALL RIGHTS. BENEFITS,
ENCUMBRANCES / f D OBLIGATIONS SET FORTH IN THE GRANT OF
EASEMENTS RECO. 1 '£D SEPTEMBER 28. 1998 AS ENTRY NO. 518627 IN
BOOK. 1186 AT PAGl 28 OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS.
Parcel #:CWPC-15-Ai: !
to secure payment of all sums icluding accruing attorneys' fees, and costs, due and owing to the
undersigned for service, labor.: i l/or materials furnished by the undersigned, as a contractor, that were
used in the construction, altcrai > i, or improvement of buildings, structures, and improvements on and
for the benefit and improvemer. if the Property.
The undersigned was ei. p oyed by, and furnished such service, labor, and materials to, Joel Sill,
who was and is the reputed ar 1 the record owner of the Property, pursuant to an agreement. The
undersigned performed and furr s »ed the first service, labor, and/or materials on or about June 25,1999,
and performed and furnished tfc ast service, tabor, and/or materials on or about January 7. 2002, and
on and between those dates df wrform and furnish service, labor, and/or materials for which the
undersigned holds and claims
icn by virtue of the provisions of §§ 38-1-1, ex. seq., Utah Code
Annotated (as amended).
Notice is also o >vided that, pursuant to §38-11-107, Utah Code Annotated (as
amended), to require a iien clai J nt to remove a lien from an owner-occupied residence, other than a

lien arising under an agreement directly with the owner, an owner can establish compliance with the
following requirements found in $§ 38-1 l-204(3)(a) and (3)(b). Utah Code Annotated (as amended):
1.

(i) the owner of the owner-occupied residence or the owner's agent entered into
a written contract with an original contractor licensed or exempt from licensure
under Title 58. Chapter 55. Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act, for the
performance o( qualified services, to obtain the performance of qualified
services by others, or for the supervision of the performance by others ot
qualified services in construction on that residence: (ii) the owner of the owneroccupied residence or the owner's agent entered into a written contract with a
real estate developer for the purchase of an owner-occupied residence: or (iii)
the owner of the owner-occupied residence or the owner's agent entered into a
written contract with a factory built housing retailer for the purchase of an
owner-occupied residence.

2.

the owner has paid in full the original contractor, licensed or exempt from
licensure under Title 58. Chapter. 55. Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act,
real estate developer, or factory built housing retailer under paragraph 1. above,
with whom the owner has a written contract in accordance with the written
contract and any amendments to the contract.

Dated this 3£7dav of January. 2002.

r^v
William Hart, dba Hart Construction
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this oO day of January. 200*
by William Hart, dba Hart Construction.
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NOTARY PUBLIC
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THIS FIRM IS ATTEMPTING TO COLLECT A DEBT
AND ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL BE USED FOR THAT PURPOSE.

